We explore the link between what people say they prefer to do and what they actually do. Using the data from an experimental project that explored trust and pro-sociality for representative samples of individuals in six Latin American capital cities, we are able to link the results of these experiments with the responses obtained from representative surveys to the same participating individuals. Individuals with higher agreement with a set of prosocial statements and who invest more in their social capital, are more willing to trust another person and are more interested in risk-pooling in economic experiments. We find that what people say through surveys and incentivized experiments is linked to what people do which gives credence to the idea that experiments can carry useful information to understand motivations and intentions in key issues of development such as pro-social behavior and social capital formation. JEL Classification Code: C90, D01, O12
Introduction
While economic experiments have become widely accepted in the profession, and taking those experiments out of the lab into the field has also proven fruitful, it is unclear how closely their findings correspond with the responses that individuals provide in surveys, arguably, the most prominent tool for traditional empirical analysis. The literature has devoted important efforts to link the results from economic experiments to real life situations (Neill et al., 1994; Karlan, 2005; Carpenter and Knowles-Myers, 2007; Benz and Meier, 2008) but not so much to the relationship between experimental outcomes and survey responses. To our knowledge, the efforts along this line have been based on data that has been gathered only among particular populations, and in most cases with college students. To name two of the most prominent examples, Glaeser et al (2000) explore the linkages between experimental and survey measures of trust and trustworthiness; and Burks, Carpenter and Verhoogen (2003) explore the links between a measure of Machiavellian behavior with trust and trustworthiness measures, having people playing both roles in the trust game. In this paper we study the link between what representative samples of individuals say and what individuals do by comparing their stated preferences regarding pro-sociality as well as their involvement in social organizations, and their corresponding actions when exposed to laboratory experiments on those same issues. Since we have collected data for a sufficiently large and demographically diverse sample, we believe that our results could prove a much stronger case regarding the debate over external validity and usefulness of using what Harrison and List (2004) call "artefactual experiments" in the field.
The key question we want to address is whether such stated preferences and revealed actions may be viewed as complements rather than substitutes. Interestingly, as straightforward as this issue is, to our knowledge exploring the complementarity or substituibility of surveys and experiments with a representative sample has not yet been broached in the economics literature. Typically, the experimental literature has placed great emphasis on design, but less so on sampling issues. On the other hand, household surveys as well as individual surveys that measure attitudes and preferences have placed great emphasis on sample representation, but both measurements are regarded as potentially flawed, particularly those of preferences, as the credibility of the average responses to the questions posed are frequently put in doubt due to the hypothetical nature of the question and the sensitivity to different biases.
In this paper, not only do we employ representative samples for six cities in Latin America to participate in incentivized economic experiments, but also have the participating individuals respond a survey on their actions and attitudes directly related to the experiments undertaken that thus allow us to test how experiments and surveys fare together. Since the main objective is to assess how both techniques compare in representative samples, we focus on well-known and commonly used laboratory experiments where protocols and overall findings appear to be well established. In particular, we applied a simple trust game, a voluntary contribution game and a risk sharing game as different social interactions where group oriented preferences should be important.
Additionally, to explore attitudes towards uncertain outcomes of the participating individuals, we measured individual aversion to risk, ambiguity and losses.
Instead of trying to explain experimental decisions (in the left-hand side) as a function of outside-the-lab variables as is usually done in much of the field experiments literature, we follow instead a strategy where we use experimental behavior as a predictor of attitudes and actions that our representative sample reported in the survey with respect to their actions taken for building and maintaining their social capital. Such empirical strategy, as discussed in Carter & Castillo (forthcoming) and Cardenas & Carpenter (2005) , could provide insights about the complementarity of experimental methods in case they can increase the power of explaining variation in the data collected in surveys, and help solve some of the problems of endogeneity that remain in the social capital literature when trying to link economic outcomes and social capital survey questions.
Our findings suggest that trusting and risk-pooling behavior in our incentivized experiments predict individuals' attitudes towards pro-social values such as humanitarianism and egalitarianism, even after controlling for the individuals' participation in building and sustaining social capital through membership, attendance and volunteering in social organizations. More interestingly, while trusting behavior -expressed by trustor's offers in the trust game (Berg et.al 1995) , are a good predictor of these actions and attitudes, trustworthiness (the responder's behavior in the game) does not explain variation in their survey responses regarding pro-social attitudes and social capital maintenance. This should be valuable for both the experimental and the social capital literatures in terms of what exact information is communicated by these experiments. Finally, we test the prediction power of a voluntary contributions (or public goods) game and find that it does not predict these attitudes and pro-social participation, although it maintains the positive sign, but suggesting that such game does not capture as closely the preferences about trust and social networking that are so critical in the operation of social capital. These results offer some insights into the information that each of these experiments is conveying and their potential to enhance the value of surveys in development studies.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the sample and the experimental design. Section 3 describes the methodological approach to measure the link between what people say and what people do. Section 4 presents our main findings. Section 5 provides additional findings based on the robustness of our variable of interest. Finally, section 6 concludes.
Sample and Experimental Design
The full sample consists of around 3,100 individuals from all backgrounds, socioeconomic levels, age cohorts, and both sexes, from the following six Latin American capital cities: Bogota, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Lima, Montevideo and San Jose. Not only do we believe that this is the most comprehensive experimental dataset to date in Latin America, but also a particularly unique one since the samples are representative at the city level. In particular, the data collected combine detailed socio-economic and demographic background with behavioral information.
To carry out the field work we conducted a series of approximately 25 sessions in each of the cities, with each session with an average of 20 people recruited in different neighborhoods and brought to a university campus room. The recruitment was based on quotas by gender, age, education and socio-economic status that were based on existing demographics in each city. Each experimental session followed the exact same protocol 1 , with the exact same sequence of activities as a team of researchers with experience in survey and field methods was selected to undertake the sample design and conduct the experiments and surveys in each city. In order to guarantee homogeneity in the application of experimental protocols the field teams participated in a training workshop at the launching of this project in Bogotá during the first quarter in 2007. This workshop provided a uniform approach to implementation and related fieldwork details such as sampling procedures, writing style and jargon in the Spanish protocol, timing of actions (i.e., invitations, pre-survey, experiments, post-surveys), elements to be included in experimental sessions and the construction of questionnaires. Details are provided in the appendix.
The samples were selected using a stratified random sampling applied at the city level. The strata were chosen on the basis of education, average family income of the districts or the territorial units that make up each city (in either quartiles or quintiles, depending on data availability), gender and age. 2 The goal of the sampling procedure was to obtain empirical distributions of individuals within these combinations of characteristics resembling those of the populations in the cities. With the sampling quotas defined, the first step of the fieldwork consisted of inviting individuals to experimental sessions. The sessions were arranged so that at least three sessions per city included only individuals from high-income strata and at least three other sessions included only individuals from lowincome strata; the rest combined individuals from all strata. Around 30 individuals were invited for each session, under the assumption that approximately one third would not show adaptations to field experiments discussed or reported in Carpenter, Harrison and List (2005) , Harrison and List (2004 ), Cárdenas (2003 ), and Cárdenas and Carpenter (2008 . 2 The age groups employed were the following: (i) 17-27; (ii) 28-38; (iii) 39-59 and (iv) 60-72. up to the session, but allowing each experimental session to go forward with roughly 20 to 25 participants each lasting between two and three hours.
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As one of the main goals of the study is to observe the effect of social heterogeneity on individuals' decisions, information on the socio-economic composition of the groups in each particular session was made as salient and clear as possible. The participants met throughout the session in one room where they were able to see each other, although they
were not allowed to communicate during the session. During the recruitment process we avoided having two people who knew each other within one session. As the sessions progressed, participants received information about their peers, depending on the particular activity.In each of the sessions participants made decisions during four activities regarding trust, public goods voluntary contributions, risk attitudes and risk sharing.
The first activity in a session was a Trust Game (Berg et.al 1995) , using the strategy method. As it is well known, in this game participants are randomly assigned in pairs: half assume the role of player 1 and the other half, that of player 2. Both groups are simultaneously located in different rooms, and identities of the pairs are never revealed, although each player receives information on key demographic characteristics of their pairs (sex, age, schooling level and socio-economic stratum). Both players receive an equal endowment, and player 1 is then asked to decide how much of this endowment he or she wants to send to player 2, knowing that player 2 will then receive three times that amount 3 Potential participants were invited several days before the scheduled sessions and were promised, on top of the potential experimental gains, a show-up fee. The day before each experimental session they were reminded of the invitation with a phone call or home visit; transportation was arranged or paid for in advance, if necessary. The day of the sessions the participants were welcomed by teams in each city and at the accorded time sessions started. Following the batteries of experiments, participants completed the survey. To reduce idiosyncratic measurement error due to the individuals' reading ability, the surveys were administered by the coordinators of the experiments and supported by a group of pollsters especially trained for these purposes. After participants completed the surveys, the payoffs from the experiments were computed and the participants received their payments (see the Appendix for details).
on top of the initial endowment everyone initially receives. In another room, player 2 is asked to decide the amount to be returned to player 1 for each possible offer from player 1, from a discrete set of fractions of amounts sent (0%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 100%).
Immediately before making their decisions, individuals are also asked to predict the decisions to be made by the other player. That is, the amount expected by player 2 from player 1, and player 1's expected returned amount from player 2. After both players make their decisions the matching of the choices is made. Replications of this game around the world have shown that people on average send half of the initial endowment to player 2, and that the returns from player 2 to player 1 generate a net positive return for player 1 of about ten to twenty percent from what was originally sent (Cárdenas and Carpenter, 2008; Ashraf, Camerer and Loewenstein, 2007) .
The second activity pursued was a one-shot dichotomous Voluntary Contributions Game, adapted from the canonical public goods games (Ledyard, 1995) , in which all participants in the session are gathered in a single room and each player is given one token that can be invested in an individual or a group account. The player that keeps the token in a private account earns an amount, for example 10 dollars, as well as one dollar for each participant that invests her token in the group account. On the other hand, if the player invests the token in the group project, her token as well as the rest of tokens in the group account yield a return of one dollar for every participant in the group. Given a group of 20 people, we would have a Marginal Per Capita Return Ratio (MPCR) of 0.10 and therefore a classical case of a social or cooperation dilemma where the Nash and dominant strategy would be to keep the token but the social optimum would be achieved if everybody invested their tokens in the group account. Before they make their individual and private decisions to contribute or not to the group, the coordinator announces both verbally and on a board the composition of the group, namely, the number of participants, the number of men and women, the number of people in each educational level, and in each socio-economic strata.
The coordinator also requests that every participant write her prediction of the number of cooperators, as none of them knows in advance whether each individual would contribute or not.
The third activity was based on the Risk Game first used in India by Binswanger show the participants a bag with ten balls, five with the low payoff and five with the high.
The second stage offers the same payoffs for these six lotteries. However, unlike in the first stage, individuals do not know the exact probabilities, but were shown that at least three of the balls correspond to the low payoff and at least three to the high payoff. The remaining 4 balls were included without telling the participants of which category 4 . The third stage also uses six lotteries with 50/50 probabilities, but includes the possibility of negative payoffs in some cases. To avoid negative payments players were endowed with a fixed amount 4 As a reviewer noted, it could be the case that the player believes the remaining 40% of possibilities should be biased against the subjects under the argument that the experimenter expects to save money on this task. In the extreme case that the player believes that the low payoff has a 0.70 probability, the expected value of a risk neutral player is decreasing on the lotteries but at a very small rate. In fact the change in the expected value should be indifferent around the intermediate lotteries, whereas in the first risk decision the expected value increases by roughly 10 percent from lottery to the next. However, the protocol did not suggest that a 0.7/0.3 distribution was likely since they were told that the remaining 40 percent could be of low or high payoffs. greater payoffs to everyone in the group, and as the group is larger, the lower the chances of getting low payoffs to pool with the group).
At the end, the coordinator randomly selects one of the four activities to be paid, and while one coordinator calculates individual earnings and privately calls upon each participant, the remaining coordinators interview each participant, filling out an individual survey in order to collect detailed information about socio-economic characteristics and attitudes towards group behavior and other sociality preferences.
The activities of these experimental sessions allow us to obtain proxy measures of trust and cooperative attitudes (both towards other individuals and groups); 5 and risk attitudes of participating individuals. These measures, paired with their stated pro-social attitudes obtained from the survey allow us to explore the linkages between statements and actions.
Methodology
As mentioned above, the survey and experiments we use in this paper were as well as subjective pro-social statements of attitudes, described below, as our key variables of interest. 6 Thus, our reduced form follows this specification:
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(1)
The dependent variables in this analysis capture the actual pro social behavior of individuals by giving information on his/her participation on social organizations, a key indicator of building and maintaining social capital. We use four different variables related as dependent variables: 1) Participation in any charity organization, 2) Assistance to the meetings of any charity organization, 3) Participation in the decision planning of any charity organization, and 4) Hours in a month spent in charity organizations. As the first dependent variables used in this paper are dichotomical, the marginal effects were estimated using Probit models. The fourth outcome is a variable which takes on the value zero with positive probability but is a continuous variable over strictly positive values. Thus following Wooldridge (2002) , these types of models can be estimated using the typical Tobit model where it is assumed that the data is censored at zero. In addition, our main variables of interest are denoted as Experiment ic and Prosocial ic , The former represents the individual result of the experiment c for the particular individual i. We use the empirical evidence derived from the three different experiments explained above: the trust game, the voluntary contributions game, and the risk pooling game. 7 In the first game we use two definitions as explanatory variables: the percentage of the initial endowment that player 1 offered to player 2 and the money that player 2 returned to player 1 at the time of his move (measured as a percentage of the money he had at that time: the initial endowment plus the amount 6 Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) argue that subjective data, such as the pro-social index used here, would be less troublesome if used as an independent rather than a dependent variable in a regression setup. If one uses subjective data in the left-hand-side, the measurement error tends to become highly correlated with a large set of characteristics and behaviors. 7 The results from the individual risk aversion activity are employed as additional controls.
received from player 1). The choice set of player 2 is, in fact, contingent to the offers made by player 1, so we also estimate equation (1) that we also run regressions using each independent category as an explanatory variable in order to evaluate the consistency of our constructed index.
Additionally, X ic is a vector of individual characteristics that includes age, schooling, gender, and socio-economic level. Vector Z ic reflects experimental controls, such as a measure of risk aversion, calculated from the experiments, and expectations about the behavior of the matched player or the group that is playing with the participant. The vector MS ic contains variables related to the matched player's or the session characteristics. In the trust game, we control by whether the matched player is male and by differences in schooling, age, and socio-economic level. For the voluntary contributions model and the risk pooling game, we control for session characteristics such as the percentage of women, the percentage of participants with less than secondary, the percentage in the lower socioeconomic level, a dummy if the individuals' schooling is above the median of the session, and the number of players. Finally,  ic is a random error term.
The exact definitions of all variables used in the regressions and the summary statistics are presented in Tables 1 and 2 , respectively. Table 3 presents the statements used in the construction of our pro-social index. Table 4 shows the results obtained when regressing the level of participation in social capital forming activities on the experimental behavior during the trust game and our pro-social attitudes index, based on responses to the questionnaire. The amounts offered by player 1 in this experiment may be interpreted as a measure of trust from the individuals towards their matched pairs 10 . When using the amounts offered in the trust game as an explanatory variable, we find a statistically significant link with actual behavior which is captured by four different outcomes of social capital: Participation in any social 8 The pro-social attitudes questions were chosen from Fong (2007) and based on indicators of humanitarianegalitarian indices and Katz and Hass (1989) . 9 Appendix 1 presents the correlation coefficients as well as their corresponding statistical significance. 10 The sample used for this regression corresponds to roughly half of the total sample as it corresponds to players 1 only. The roles of player 1 and 2 were randomly assigned at the start of each session.
Findings
organization, Assistance to the meetings of any social organizations, Participation in the decision planning of any social organization and Number of hours spent in a month by participating in social organizations. It is worth to note that this effect registers being significant even after controlling for our Pro-social index, variable that denotes revealed attitudes from individuals, suggesting that the experiment captures additional behavioral information about pro-sociality that the opinions on the survey statements was not capturing. In relation to other survey controls, the age and the participant's years of schooling are positive and statistically significant mostly at the one percent level. Similarly, having a high risk aversion appears to matter, as it is positive statistically significant in most of the cases. This result will be valuable when we discuss later the results about the riskpooling game because of the role that risk-sharing institutions play as social nets when people face uncertain outcomes. Table 5 , runs the same specification of Table 4 but considers each category used to construct the Pro-social index independently. Thus, we run a separate regression using each specific category as our main explanatory variable for Prosocial revealed attitudes. The definitions of each category are explained in detail in Table 1 .
These results support the fact that our game variable captures relevant and consistent information to predict actual behavior, as it is also registered a significant and positive impact for the First player's offer. Additionally, categories 1, 2, and 5 (People should worry about other people's well-being; In a good society, people feel responsible for others;
People have the moral obligation to share part of their resources with poor people) seem to present more evidence of a positive link to pro-social actual behavior.
In Table 6 , we use the share of reciprocity of player 2 as our experimental behavior variable. Here, we use specifications where our variable for revealed attitudes is treated as an index and also where each pro-social category itself is used as an explanatory variable.
We find a strong connection between what people say and what people actually do, as in most cases the coefficient of the pro-social index or the independent categories are positive and statistically significant; but here the experimental behavior variable information on reciprocal responses by player 2 seems to be trivial to predict actual behavior. This should not come as a surprise since decisions by players 2 in the game should not be interpreted as signals of trust but more likely as signs of reciprocity; further, since we have used the strategy method for this game, players 2 elicit their reciprocal responses without knowing yet the actual offer by player 1. Although responders' choices in this game are often described as measures of trustworthiness, the data seems to suggest that trustors' decisions are better predictors of the actions taken by individuals. In this line of thought, we believe that the intentions that are revealed by players' 1 in the trust game are good measures of the innate propensity of an individual to engage in a costly and risky enterprise such as trusting a stranger by committing personal income or time in a relationship that could be mutually beneficial without the need of an enforceable contract, just as is the case when forming social capital institutions. This is supported on the fact that for each of the possible actions declared by our respondents (belonging, attending meetings, contributing in planning, and time spent) we find that the offers by the first mover are strong predictors of such actions that involve investing personal income or time without guaranteeing the benefits of such investment. Table 7 and 8 displays the same results as Table 6 but for our games Risk Pooling and Voluntary Contributions, respectively. Here we also run specifications using the aggregate index of pro-social attitudes as well as the five independent categories used to construct the index.
The purpose of the Risk Pooling game is to measure the propensity of individuals to form an income pooling group when facing uncertain outcomes. We find ( Table 7 ) that individuals that were decided to join a risk-pooling group in the experiment and that stated pro-social preferences are also more interested in being involved in social organizations, as the coefficient of both the pro-social index as well as the independent categories are positive and statistically significant for most of the cases 11 . Again, the individuals who decide to share the risk with the group seem to be more prone to social participation and formation of social capital, just in the same manner that social capital institutions are used as safety nets for unexpected negative shocks.
In the voluntary contributions game we interpret an individual's decision to contribute to the public good as his willingness to cooperate. As is well known, in this game the decision to contribute to the group increases the benefits for all, but not contributing will always yield greater individual payoffs providing an incentive to free ride. Full cooperation yields greater payoffs to everyone than if full free-riding occurs, and the gains from cooperation increases with the number of players as in the design one player will be indifferent between keeping the token and investing it in the group if nine other players had contributed. In fact, we find in Table 8 a strong relationship between Pro-social attitudes (being as index or independent categories) and our actual behavior outcomes such as forming and maintaining social capital, but here our game variable has no significant explanatory power, although it has the expected positive sign. This presents an interesting puzzle to the question about the use of these different games and the information each of them conveys. First of all, the public goods game we use is statistically correlated with the behavior by players 1 in the trust game. Those investing in the group account sent offers that were around 10% higher (p-value=0.000) than the offers sent by those investing in the private account and thus free-riding on the contributions of the former. Yet, the contribution decision in the public goods game is not a strong predictor here of what people declared as actions they take to build and sustain their social capital (Table 8 ). This suggests that more research is needed on why the public goods game does not predict investment in social capital but the trust game and the risk-pooling do.
Conclusions
In this paper we report the results of four experiments (trust, public goods, risk and Trusting others, specially strangers, should be a good proxy for measuring the basis on which social capital is built. We find that those who are willing to send higher offers to another person in the session are also more likely to invest time to be a member and maintain a social organization or a charity in their daily life, even after controlling for their attitudes towards a redistributive or humanitarian society, according to the usual indices calculated through opinion surveys. We find that the trust game offers are a good predictor of these pro-social attitudes and actions, and although the trust game offers and the contributions to the public good are correlated, the latter are not statistically strong predictors of the formation of social capital.
The risk pooling game, on the other hand, involves also situations in which one's decisions affect several people, around 20 in our case. The greater the pro-sociality index of the person, the more important it should be to act in a group-oriented manner which includes also investing more in institutions that provide help to others such as charities, just as we find in our data. In fact much of the work of social organizations and charities is aimed at providing a safety net for the poorest who have to bear most of risks associated with deprivation. By deciding to join the risk-pooling game one is willing to forego the extra earnings of obtaining the high payoff and distribute them through the rest of the riskpooling group.
These results could be consistent with the "warm glow" explanation of charitable behavior by individuals (Andreoni, 1990) , or the models of social preferences where the payoff to others increases one's utility (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Levine 1998; Rabin, 1993) .
However, notice that for the case of the risk-pooling game joining the group does not necessarily implies increasing the group's outcome unless more players choose riskier lotteries. That is in fact the case in our data. Although risk-poolers and non-risk-poolers chose similar risk before the risk-pooling decision, those who decided to join the riskpooling group in fact increased their level of risk tolerance and therefore increased the expected value for everyone in the group. It could be the case also that joining the group is also associated with group membership or ingroup/outgroup phenomena (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) where solidarity values reflected in the pro-sociality attitudes produce greater utility for those joining the group in the game. In any case, the results suggest that trusting others and be willing to share risks can be important variables when understanding what people believe about the altruistic and redistributive roles of society and the state, and also help explain the investment people make in their social capital. If such preferences such as altruism, trust and risk-sharing propensity are of importance in the understanding of how social norms and social capital emerge and contribute to poverty reduction, measuring these through the use of economic experiments as complements of other tools should be a fruitful avenue. For instance, detecting groups where inter-personal trust is low, using incentivized experiments, would suggest policy makers that additional efforts should be made for creating the conditions in which social capital is built by communities. Number of hours spent in a month participating in social organizations. The organizations or groups included are the following: charity, community or neighborhood committee, religious group, state-promoted organizations, ethnic organizations, cultural or sport group, education oriented programs or groups, environment conservation, neighbor surveillance and security, labor union, political party.
Experiment variables Initial offer by Player 1
Percentage of money offered by player 1 to player 2 in the Trust Game. From the amount received by player 1, he/she had five options: to give 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, or 100% of his/her money to player 2. Return offer by Player 2
The fraction of money that player 2 decided to send at the time of her/his decision. The numerator is the monetary amount sent at her/his move. The denominator is the initial endowment plus three times the amount sent by player 1. Second player's return offer conditioned to effective Player 1's offer Percentage of money that player 2 decided to send to player 1, depending on the amount he/she received from player 1. The numerator is the percentage of money that could be returned by player 2 in the Trust Game (0%, 25%, 50%, 75% or 100%), and in the denominator the largest amount that he could received form Player 1, depending on the assumption of initial offer made (0%, 25%, …etc. This variable can take values from 0% to 100%. It reflects player's 1 expectation about the percentage to be returned by player 2, considering the different set of options he has (that set of options depends on the percentage of money gave by player 1).
Percentage of expected contributors to VCM (VCM regressions)
This variable result from the division of the number of participants the player expects to participate in the group account by the total number of participants in each session. It ranges from 0% to 100%. Categorical variable that ranges between -2 to 2 as a result of subtracting the matched player's socio-economic level from the participant's one. Each category was converted into a dummy. I all regressions, the omitted dummy was the category "0", when there was no difference between the matched players.
Individual's socio-demographic characteristics

Session characteristics Percentage of women
Percentage of women in each session. It ranges from 0% to 100%. Level of education higher than the median of the session Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the individual has a level of education above the median level of education within the session.
Percentage with less than complete secondary education
Percentage of participants in each session that have less than complete secondary education. It ranges from 0% to 100%.
Percentage in the lower (or medium) socioeconomic level
Percentage of participants in each session that reside in the lower (or medium) socio-economic level. It ranges from 0% to 100%.
Number of players per session
Number of participants in each session. Robust standard errors, clustered by session and country, are in parentheses. For the first three outcomes, marginal effects are reported using probit regressions; for the last one, it is used tobit regressions with a censoring limit of zero. Dummies per city are included. The tobit model includes a constant. * Significant at ten percent; ** significant at five percent; *** significant at one percent. Robust standard errors, clustered by session and country, are in parentheses. For the first three outcomes, marginal effects are reported using probit regressions; for the last one, it is used tobit regressions with a censoring limit of zero. Dummies per city are included. The tobit model includes a constant. * Significant at ten percent; ** significant at five percent; *** significant at one percent. Each regression is controlled for socio-demographic characteristics: age, years of education, socio-economic level; experimental variables: percentage expected to be returned by the matched player, risk aversion; and matched player's characteristics: gender of the participant and the matched player, age difference, dummy if higher level of education than the matched, schooling difference and socio-economic level. Robust standard errors, clustered by session and country, are in parentheses. For the first three outcomes, marginal effects are reported using probit regressions; for the last one, it is used tobit regressions with a censoring limit of zero. Dummies per city are included. The tobit model includes a constant. * Significant at ten percent; ** significant at five percent; *** significant at one percent. Each regression is controlled for socio-demographic characteristics: age, years of education, socio-economic level; experimental variables: percentage expected to be received from the matched player; and matched player's characteristics: gender of the participant and the matched player, age difference, dummy if higher level of education than the matched, schooling difference and socio-economic level. We also run regressions using second player's return offer conditioned to effective Player 1's offer (being 0%, 25%, 50%, 75% or 100%); and the results holds very similar to the effective case reported in the table. Robust standard errors, clustered by session and country, are in parentheses. For the first three outcomes, marginal effects are reported using probit regressions; for the last one, it is used tobit regressions with a censoring limit of zero. Dummies per city are included. The tobit model includes a constant. * Significant at ten percent; ** significant at five percent; *** significant at one percent. Each regression is controlled for socio-demographic characteristics: gender, age, years of education, socio-economic level; experimental variables: risk aversion; and session characteristics: percentage of women, dummy if level of education is higher than the median of the session, percentage with less than complete secondary education, percentage in the lower and medium socio-economic level, and number of players. Robust standard errors, clustered by session and country, are in parentheses. For the first three outcomes, marginal effects are reported using probit regressions; for the last one, it is used tobit regressions with a censoring limit of zero. Dummies per city are included. The tobit model includes a constant. * Significant at ten percent; ** significant at five percent; *** significant at one percent. Each regression is controlled for socio-demographic characteristics: gender, age, years of education, socio-economic level; experimental variables: percentage of expected contributors to VCM, risk aversion; and session characteristics: percentage of women, dummy if level of education is higher than the median of the session, percentage with less than complete secondary education, percentage in the lower and medium socio-economic level, and number of players. 
